Jurisdictional Control and Network Growth by Xie, Feng & Levinson, David M
Netw Spat Econ (2009) 9:459–483
DOI 10.1007/s11067-007-9036-5
Jurisdictional Control and Network Growth
Feng Xie · David Levinson
Published online: 18 October 2007
© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract Transport infrastructure evolves over time in a complex process as
part of a dynamic and open system including travel demand, land use, as
well as economic and political initiatives. As transport infrastructure changes,
each traveler may adopt a new schedule, frequency, destination, mode, and/or
route, and in the long term may change the location of their activities.
These new behaviors create demand for a new round of modifications of
infrastructure. In the long run, we observe the collective change in the capacity,
service, connectivity, and connection patterns (topology) of networks. This
paper examines how a fixed set of places incrementally gets connected as
transport networks are constructed and upgraded over time. A simulator of
network incremental connection (SONIC) is constructed to model the process
of incremental connections and examines how networks evolve differently
under centralized versus decentralized jurisdictional initiatives. Exploring the
mechanism underlying this dynamic process can answer questions such as how
urban networks have developed into various topologies, which network pat-
terns are more efficient, and whether and how transport engineers, planners,
and decision makers can guide the dynamics of land uses and infrastructure in
a desired direction.
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1 Introduction
The temporal growth of transport networks holds intrinsic interests for profes-
sionals and researchers. As early as the 1960s, geographers observed that the
deployment and transformation of transportation networks followed a staged
process and constructed a series of staged connection models to replicate this
process (Lachene 1965; Pred 1966; Rimmer 1967; Taaffe et al. 1963). This
research, however, had to deal with simple networks based on heuristics and
intuition, and after an initial surge in activity, the field remained dormant
over the following 40 years, due to the difficulty of modeling the complexity
inherent in network growth problem.
This complexity arises from the many actors who design, construct, expand,
control, manage, maintain, operate, and commercialize transport networks
over the duration of decades. In particular, the development of all modes of
transport, as observed by Taaffe et al. (1996), has been affected by a constantly
shifting mix of private enterprise, on the one hand, and government initiatives
at local, state, and national levels, on the other hand. Ownership ranges from
governments, private investors, to public–private-partnership. Narrowing our
focus to public ownership in transport development, centralized provision of
transport infrastructure involves a single unitary government that is respon-
sible for the financing, investment, maintenance, and operation of transport
networks (e.g. roads), while a decentralized pattern involves autonomous
local jurisdictions that build networks (roads) individually, or in coalitions, to
connect to each other. In either case, central or local governments provide
transport to maximize the aggregate benefit of their constituents. A broad
literature of financial federalism has discussed the advantages and disad-
vantages associated with centralized versus decentralized provision of public
goods (Epple and Nechyba 2004). In general, a centralized decision-making
pattern has advantages in that it can effectively reduces conflicts between
local jurisdictions arising from the intrinsic characteristics of infrastructure as
natural spatial monopolies, such as the likelihood of free riders and spillovers,
but a ’one size fits all’ provision of infrastructure may fail to reflect local needs
and thus undermine local interests, which may lead to the adoption of an
alternative decentralized decision-making pattern. In reality, the two systems
are intertwined and the trade-off between them profoundly shapes the physical
structure of networks over time.
The trade-off between centralized versus decentralized provision of public
goods has been the classic problem examined in political science and public
economics both in theory (Besley and Coate 2003; Oates 1972) and in practice
(Knight 2002). Specifically, the experience in road decentralization through-
out the world has been examined (Humplick and Moini-Araghi 1996a,b).
Transportation economists also consider ownership and investment choice in
transportation networks (Gomez-Ibanez et al. 1999; Levinson 2002; Verhoef
and Rouwendal 2004; Zhang and Levinson 2005a), although they had to limit
their theoretic investigation on small, hypothetical networks, largely due to the
computational complexity that arise from the optimization or game-theoretic
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approaches they adopted. The dynamic impact of ownership structure in
shaping transport networks has not been examined.
In the past decade, a marked revival of the interests has been seen on the
modeling and analysis of transportation network growth, especially aroused
by the cornerstone findings made by Barabási (2002) in network science.
Self-organization and agent-based simulation are also extensively introduced
from natural science to model the growth of transportation networks while
accounting for various economic initiatives and behavioral rules involved in
this process (Helbing et al. 1997; Levinson and Yerra 2006; Xie and Levinson
2007; Yamins et al. 2003; Yerra and Levinson 2005). Levinson and Xie (2007)
provided a comprehensive review of this literature. Among these studies, a
few efforts have been made to model network growth while accounting for
the role of heterogeneous political initiatives. Montes de Oca and Levinson
(2006), based on a series of interviews with officials and engineers in the
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area, Minnesota, revealed that different levels of
jurisdictions (state, region, county) had developed different decision making
processes in terms of funding allocation to road projects. Levinson et al. (2007)
then incorporated these "stated" jurisdictional decision rules in a network
growth model to forecast the Twin-Cities seven-county road network 30 years
from now.
Extending these efforts, this paper examines in particular how a network
evolves differently under centralized versus decentralized jurisdictional con-
trol during its early deployment phase, as the network expands and isolated
places get connected incrementally. Given the complexity it involves, this study
is not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, it focuses on providing a tool
which represents the deployment of a network in a simulation environment,
and demonstrates the capability of assessing policies under alternative juris-
dictional controls quantitatively. A series of models have been encapsulated
in this tool, which we refer to as SONIC (simulator of network incremental
connection), to predict the decisions of travelers on destination and route
choices on a daily basis, as well as the decisions of central or local jurisdictions
with regard to their financing, investment, maintenance and operation policies
in the long term.
This paper proceeds in the following form: the next section presents the defi-
nition of the incremental network growth problem. Models are then developed
to represent strategic players and their decisions during network, which are
followed by simulation experiments and results. The conclusions summarize
the findings and suggest directions for future research.
2 An incremental connection problem
In this section, we first present the graphic definition of an incremental network
growth problem. Strategic players that affect the deployment of a network are
then presented, with their respective perspectives and behaviors explained.
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2.1 The graphic definition
The incremental connection problem is proposed to represent the sequential
deployment of a surface transport (road) network over space and time, which
assumes the form of “link addition problems” that have been previously de-
fined in transport geography (Harggett and Chorley 1969), in general, dealing
with how links will be added among a set of fixed nodes to create an efficient
network. Suppose we have the complete graph G = {V, L} that comprises a
finite set of potential vertices V and potential edges E. A set of established
places is prespecified as P ⊆ V.
Established places could be connected in one continuous network or in
separate subnetworks (Gm = {Vm, Lm}, m = 0, 1, 2,). A subnetwork holds the
following three properties:
A subnetwork must be a subset of the compete graph G:
Vm ⊆ V, Lm ⊆ L (1)
A pair of subnetworks shares no vertices or edge:
Vm ∩ Vn = ∅ (2)
A subnetwork contains at least one established place (an isolated place
without any connection can be viewed as a scalar subnetwork):
Vm ∩ P = ∅ (3)
It is assumed that subnetworks are isolated in space with infinite transporta-
tion cost in between. An internal connection is defined as the connection made
between two vertices that belong to one subgraph. On the other hand, if a
connection is made between two vertices that belong to different subgraphs, it
is referred to as an external connection. An internal or external connection
represents a series of nodes and two-way links that consecutively connect
along the geographical shortest-distance path in the complete graph. Figure 1
presents a graphic example for illustration. Based on the above specification,
an incremental connection process is defined as:
• Step 0: Start with the complete graph G and a set of unconnected places
that belong to separate subgraphs.
• Step 1: One internal or external connection is made at a time.
• Step 2: Two separate subgraphs merge when an external connection is
made connecting them.
• Step 3: As the process goes on, a connected network of places and
established links may eventually emerge. Steps 1 and 2 are repeated until
the topology of the established network remains unchanged based on
prespecified stopping criteria.











Fig. 1 A graphic example of external versus internal connections. Solid lines represent established
links, dashed lines proposed connections, dark dots established places, and white dots intersections.
Connections v3 − v4, v8 − v9 are internal connections while v5 − v7 is an external connection
2.2 Strategic players
Road infrastructure is provided and operated in a value chain which in-
volves various groups of players, such as financiers, providers (represented by
planners and engineers), and travelers. Thus the deployment course of a road
network is played out as the outcome of the decisions made by these groups
subject to their own interests. In order to represent the above defined network
growth problem in the transport environment, key players in this process and
their rationales are introduced as follows:
2.2.1 Travelers
To simplify the modeling, it is taken that travelers choose destinations follow-
ing a gravity relationship, and choose routes that minimize their travel cost.
The generalized travel cost includes travel time and monetary cost travelers
pay for travel, such as fuel taxes and user tolls. A deterministic behavioral
mechanism assumes travelers choose the least cost route from their origin to
destination if they have perfect information regarding travel time over the
entire network. To relax this assumption by including a random component
in travelers’ perception of travel time, this study assumes that travelers choose
routes to minimize their perceived travel cost.
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2.2.2 Providers
Road provision could be public or private, centralized or decentralized. This
study, however, considers public roads provided by jurisdictional authorities
only, which was the common practice during the twentieth century for roads in
the USA. Note also that although a mixed ownership of public roads at local
and central levels is common, this study treats centralized and decentralized
road provision separately.
Ideally, a jurisdiction seeks to maximize the aggregate welfare of its local
residents (Levinson 2002). Although tolls or taxes may be levied for using
its roads as a means of financing, it is assumed that the central jurisdiction
does not intend to maximize its toll revenue, because user tolls or taxes
increase the access cost to properties, therefore reducing windfall gains in
land values for road provision, and the end effect on overall welfare would
be the same (Mohring and Harwitz 1962). Instead, it is assumed that the
central agency provides and manages public roads aiming to maximize its land
value (indicated by aggregate accessibility of the region), as road investment
leads to the reduction of access cost to properties, and to increased aggregate
accessibility and accrued land value in the long run.
A local authority maximizes the welfare of its own residents. The local
agent builds roads for its own residents. Those roads however could be used
by travelers from other jurisdictions. To reduce the free-rider effect, it is
reasonable to expect that local agents will charge user tolls on the roads they
own and adjust toll rates according to the fluctuation of the demand. Therefore,
it is assumed in this research a local jurisdiction builds and operates roads to
increase both toll revenue and the aggregate accessibility of local residents.
To make matters more complicated, when more than one local jurisdiction
participates in the project, negotiation regarding how construction cost and
revenue associated with a road project will be split may be required. It is also
assumed that whether a road project is built by a single local jurisdiction or by
the joint venture of several, the road project will be managed and maintained
as a whole by a project operator who represents the owner(s).
2.2.3 Central bank
A bank agent is involved when jurisdictions need to save the surplus of
toll revenue for future investment or borrow money from future for present
spending. The bank pays interests for the savings and provides loads at an
interest rate. The bank prioritizes road construction projects with funding
needs trading off risk for reward. For simplicity of this study, we assume a
central bank agent and no spread between the rate for savings and the rate for
lending.
3 Model specification
In this section, simulation models are constructed to predict the strategic
decisions made by major players during network growth. An integration of




















Fig. 2 Framework of the SONIC models
these component models implements the above defined incremental network
growth process which creates a network link-by-link to connect a pre-specified
set of established places. As illustrated in the flowchart of Fig. 2, travel demand
models predict daily traffic across individual links on a given network; toll rates
on roads are set and adjusted in the pricing models on a daily basis while toll
revenue annually accrues to central or local jurisdictions. Expansion models
expand existing congested roads, while new construction models choose one
and only one new connection at a time (if any) for construction. After road
investments are made, the time period is incremented and the whole process is
repeated (in this study one time period represents a year as the morning peak
hour traffic is predicted and converted to yearly traffic for investment models).
The process is terminated when neither expansion nor new construction occurs
or up to a maximum of 50 iterations.
Note that the model is simplified in that spatial activities are distributed
among a given set of places and remain fixed over time. Additionally, spatial
accessibility is priced at a constant rate associated with accrued land value.
Agents such as employers, resident workers, and landowners would have come
into play if the mutual effects between land use and transport are considered
in a broader context. In this regard, parallel research by (Levinson et al.
2007) that simulates the co-evolution of land use and transport networks
complements this study.
3.1 Notation
Variables and coefficients that will appear in the remainder of this paper are
summarized in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 2 List of parameters
Parameter Description
ξ0, ξ1, ξ2 Coefficients in trip generation
σ0, σ1, σ2 Coefficients in trip attraction
ω1, ω2 Coefficients in empirical capacity-speed relation
υ Value of time
θ Spatial interaction coefficient
μ Expansion share of investment budget
κ MSA convergence threshold
ρ1, ρ2 Toll rate adjustments under decentralized control
β0, β1, β2 Coefficients in empirical construction cost models
φ Coefficient that coverts peak hour traffic to daily traffic
χ Ip Ownership share of place i in project p
δ
p




Dummy denoting if link a is on the least-cost path
from place i to j
π Value of accessibility to jobs
λa Proportion of resident-travelers on link a
ε Constant
3.2 Travel demand models
The travel demand model predicts travel needs between origins and destina-
tions associated with spatial activities, travelers destination, mode and route
choices, and predicts aggregate traffic on a given network topology. The travel
demand models for this study follow the classic four-step planning process
(de Dios Ortuzar and Willumsen 2001) including trip generation, trip distribu-
tion, and traffic assignment while skipping modal choice by assuming a single
mode of trips. Since the subject network in the incremental network growth
problem changes over time and is fragmental at the beginning, travel demand
forecasting is conducted for each subgraph at each time period.
This study includes only two types of land use activities: population and
employment. The trip generation and attraction of a place is simply estimated
as a linear combination of the quantities of employment and population in this
place, without distinguishing trips by purpose:
Oi = ξ0 + ξ1 Ji + ξ2Wi (4)
Di = σ0 + σ1 Ji + σ2Wi (5)
A doubly constrained trip distribution model is implemented to predict the
travel demand between a pair of origin and destination places. The interaction
between places assumes a gravity-type negative exponential form:
Tij = Ki K jOi Dje−θ t̃ij (6)







a (ta + τa
/
υ) + 2t0 i = j
t0 i = j
(7)
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Traffic assignment adopts the basic procedure of a stochastic user equilib-
rium (SUE; Sheffi 1985), while also including tolls. Suppose, in an extremely
decentralized pricing strategy, road operators set a toll on each subordinate
link and adjust the toll rate dependent on through traffic (τa = τa( fa)). When
equilibrium is reached, neither travelers nor road operators would deviate
their decisions unilaterally. A revised method of successive average (MSA)
procedure is then proposed as follows to pursue this equilibrium:
• Step 0: Perform a stochastic network loading procedure based on {t̃0a =
t0a + τ 0a /υ}, the set of initial generalized travel times from the resultant
generalized travel times of the preceding time period, which generate a
set of link flows { f 1a }. Set n:=1• Step 1: Update toll on each link τ na = τa( f na ), ∀a.• Step 2: update link travel time on each link tna = ta( f na ), ∀a.• Step 3: Perform a stochastic network loading procedure based on the cur-
rent set of generalized link travel times {t̃na = tna + τ na /υ}, which generates
an auxiliary link flow pattern { f̂ na }.
• Step 4: f n+1a = f na + (1/n)( f̂ na − f na )• Step 5: Stop upon convergence or set n:=n+1 and go to Step 1.
This study sets the convergence rule with a maximal allowable link flow
change between two consecutive network loadings and implements it within
a maximum of 150 iterations:∣∣ f n+1a − f na ∣∣ < κ, ∀a (8)
Powell and Sheffi (1982) have proven that the convergence of MSA for
SUE is ensured only if t̃a( fa) and dt̃a( fa)/dfa are strictly positive and bounded
for feasible values of fa. Without a toll the conditions are commonly met in
practice, for instance, with the fourth power US BPR curve (Bureau of Public
Roads 1964):
ta = (la/sa)(1 + 0.15( fa/Ca)4.0) (9)
The setting of toll rate will be discussed in more details in the pricing models.
3.3 Pricing models
Charging for the service of road transport provides road suppliers a source of
income as well as a means of recovering road investment. Suppose the travel
demand on a link depends solely on its flow and the inverse demand curve is
indicated by Ya( f ). Suppose the proportion of trips made by local residents at
a given point of time is λa, and then the volume of trips made by residents is
λa fa while that by non-residents is (1 − λa) fa. Let’s assume λa is fixed over a
small change of flow or toll rate. For a jurisdiction that controls this link, its net




(Ya( f ) − ta − τa)df + faτa (10)
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Note that while the toll is imposed without discriminating between resident
and non-resident travelers, the toll revenue from residents is viewed as a
transfer within the jurisdiction, which is not included in the net social benefit.
To maximize the benefit, set the first derivative of Eq. (10) with regard to λa at
zero which then yields:
Ya( fa) = ta( fa) + ∂ta( fa)
∂ fa
fa − 1 − λa
λa
(τa( fa) + ∂τa( fa)
∂ fa
fa) (11)
The left-hand side of the equation represents the marginal benefit of produc-
ing an extra trip while the right-hand side represents the marginal cost, which
includes the average travel cost per trip, the change in the average cost, and the
change in the toll rate from serving an additional trip. In order to maximize the
net social benefit, we need to set a toll such that:
τa( fa) = ∂ta( fa)
∂ fa
fa − 1 − λa
λa




τa( fa) + (1 − λa)∂τa( fa)
∂ fa
fa − λa ∂ta( fa)
∂ fa
fa = 0 (13)
This is a partial differential equation. If ta( fa) is specified as a BPR function
as in Eq. (9), the solution to this equation is then given by:
τa( fa) = 0.6λa
5 − 4λa (la/sa)( fa/Ca)




Unfortunately, the solution is not unique due to the unspecified constant
ε. When λa = 1, that is all the travelers are local (it applies to the centralized
jurisdictional control), the toll rate is set at marginal travel cost:





(la/sa)(1 + 0.15( fa/Ca)4.0)
)
∂ fa
fa = 0.6(la/sa)( fa/Ca)4.0 (15)
Although fuel tax is still the most common practice throughout the USA,
marginal cost pricing has been the subject of academic interest for decades
as the first-best optimal pricing strategy in theory (Gomez-Ibanez et al. 1999;
Mohring and Harwitz 1962), and started to gain popularity among practitioners
in recent years. The above equation represents the marginal-cost pricing
function that has been derived in the one-link static scenario under centralized
jurisdictional control. Note that in the short run, the free flow speed and
capacity are fixed and the toll rate is adjusted solely depending on through
traffic.
When λa = 0, the solution becomes:
τa( fa) = −∂τa( fa)
∂ fa
fa (16)
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This is the toll rate that maximizes toll revenue (τa fa) when all the travelers
are non-residents, which is the case when the road operator is private. Note
that it is assumed ∂τa( fa)
∂ fa
< 0, indicating that the toll rate decreases as the
volume of trips increases.
The complexity of road pricing, however, goes beyond the one-link static
model. Considering network effects, the demand on a link depends not only on
the travel cost of this link, but also on the costs of other links, which becomes
too complex to be specified as an equation. In practice, Anderson and Mohring
(1997) computed marginal congestion costs on the road network of the Twin
Cities area using a link-by-link method, accordingly proposing a marginal
congestion pricing policy, based on the assumption that marginal congestion
costs for each link could be used as substitutes for the true system-wide
marginal congestion costs. Safirova et al. (2007) compared marginal congestion
costs computed link-by-link with measures taking into account network effects,
finding that while network effects are not significant in the aggregate, marginal
cost measured on a single link does not accurately predict the actual congestion
cost on that link.
Following Anderson and Mohring (1997), we adopt a link-by-link marginal
cost pricing policy under centralized jurisdictional control, in which the central
authority sets the marginal-cost price described in Eq. (15) as if each road is
operated in the one-link static environment. In this case, the generalized travel
time on a link can be written as:
t̃a = ta + τ ca /υ
= (la/sa)(1 + (0.15 + 0.6υ−1)( fa/Ca)4.0) (17)
According to Powell and Sheffi (1982), the necessary conditions for the
convergence of MSA in traffic assignment are satisfied.
Under decentralized jurisdictional control, it is assumed links are operated
individually by road operators. Due to the imperfect and incomplete infor-
mation involved in the process, a heuristic price-probing method is proposed
to predict individual links toll setting behaviors. (Bayesian Nash equilibrium
may be found analytically when there are several links setting their toll rates,
but the game theoretic problem becomes almost unsolvable for a real-size
network). The following implementation procedure is presented, which is
then embedded in the toll-updating step of the aforementioned revised MSA
algorithm to pursue equilibrium:
• Step 0: The initial toll rate is estimated using marginal-cost price with the
flow adopted from the preceding time period (use estimated flow for a new
link).
• Step 1: In the second MSA iteration, each link attempts to increase their
toll rate by ρ1, as the operator knows the price should be somewhere
between the marginal cost price and the higher profit-maximizing price but
does not know what the exact increase should be.
• Step 2: In iteration n, the toll rate is updated based on the information
derived from previous iterations:
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– Step 2.1: The proportion of resident-travelers (λna) is updated after
each network loading. Since it is assumed that the operator of a link
represents a joint venture of the places that own this link, travelers
from each owner/place are weighted according to its respective share
and summed up to the quantity of resident travelers.
– Step 2.2: the change of net social benefit (Bn−1a ) from iteration n − 2
to n − 1 is estimated. As the travel demand changes in response to the
increase or decrease in the generalized travel time, with relatively small
changes in cost, the change of consumer surplus can be approximated





f n−1a + f n−2a
)
(18)
Since the operator is concerned with consumers surplus from resident-
travelers plus toll revenue from non-residents, the change of social







a + λn−2a f n−2a
)
+ f n−1a τ n−1a − f n−2a τ n−2a (19)
– Step 2.3: a link changes its toll rate by τ na = τ na − τ n−1a according to
the following myopic rules:
If Bn−1a = 0, the operator would expect its benefit may be at a local
maximum, so the toll rate remains unchanged (τ na = 0);
If Bn−1a > 0, then τ na > 0, meaning if the net social benefit increased
during the last iteration, the operator would keep the direction of toll
adjustment. Suppose in this case it will adopt a conservative pricing
policy which increases its toll at a decreasing rate (0 < ρ2 < 1) in order
to approach a local maximum:
τ na = ρ2τ n−1a (20)
If Bn−1a < 0, then τ na < 0 , meaning if the net social benefit de-
creased, the operator would change the direction of toll adjustment.
If Bn−1a < 0 and Bn−2a > 0, the operator would expect a local max-
ima that lies somewhere in between, so a toll could be set as:
τ na = −τ n−1a
∣∣Bn−1a ∣∣/(∣∣Bn−1a ∣∣ + ∣∣Bn−2a ∣∣) (21)
If Bn−1a < 0 and Bn−2a < 0, the benefit has decreased since iteration
n-2, so the operator would adjust the toll further back beyond τ n−2a .
τ na = −τ n−1a
(∣∣Bn−1a ∣∣ + ∣∣Bn−2a ∣∣)/∣∣Bn−1a ∣∣ (22)
3.4 Investment models
The implementation of road investment is illustrated in Fig. 3. It is assumed
agents under centralized or decentralized scenarios make investment decisions
based on benefit–cost analysis. For each time period, projects with the highest
benefit–cost ratios will be built first until the budget (estimated from toll
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Year k Year k+1
Road Network
Fig. 3 Implementation of road investment process
revenue) is exhausted. Based on estimated benefit–cost ratios, an intelligent
agent should be able to rank expansion versus new construction projects
in terms of their funding priorities. For the purpose of simplicity, however,
this study separates an expansion budget from a given portion (μ) of annual
income. The component models of revenue, benefit, cost, expansion, and new
construction in this process are explained in turn as follows:
3.4.1 Toll revenue
A central authority collects toll revenue from all its roads. Suppose public
roads are built and managed in projects, the annual income of a central agent















Under decentralized control, on the other hand, a road operator collects toll
revenue from its subordinate links and the remaining revenue after necessary











In the centralized case, the central government’s benefit associated with
road investment is estimated by the increase of property value throughout
the region due to improved accessibility, while under decentralized control,
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each place’s benefit comes both from the increased value of local properties
and from projected toll revenue from non-residents. Toll collected from a
jurisdiction’s local residents are simply considered transfers, and are dropped
from the benefit calculations for both centralized and decentralized cases.
Accessibility to jobs reflects the desirability of a place by calculating jobs
opportunities that are available from this place via a road network but are
also impeded by the travel cost on the network. The accessibility to jobs is





As discussed before, it is assumed the land value of a place is estimated by
pricing spatial accessibility at a constant rate according to:
Ui = π Ai (26)
The monetary value of a unit of gravity-type spatial accessibility to jobs
is estimated in a recent empirical study by El-Geneidy and Levinson (2006)
based on 44,429 home sale records for the year of 2004 in the Twin Cities
metropolitan region. A hedonic model discloses the relation between single-
family residence property values and accessibilities to jobs and to residents
with other factors controlled. In essence the capitalized value of access in home
prices reflects the value of time saved in the long run.
3.4.3 Cost
Cost functions estimate the monetary cost of proposed expansion or new con-
struction (spending on maintenance is neglected for simplicity). Our expansion
and new construction models adopt an empirical cost function estimated by
Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003), also assuming that any project can be
completed within one year.












Note that the costs above are measured in thousands of dollars. After the
costs of expansion and new construction are appropriated from, remaining
annual income accrues to a jurisdiction’s current balance. The balance of a
central jurisdiction at the beginning of iteration k+1 is calculated as follows:
Z c,k+1 = Z c,k(1 + r) + Rc,k − Eke − Ekn
Where : r =
{
rs, i f Z c,k > 0
rl, i f Z c,k < 0 (29)
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In the decentralized scenario, the toll revenue and expansion cost of a
project is split between owner jurisdictions according to their shares (how to
determine the shares will be discussed later):














Where : r =
{
rs, i f Z
d,k
i > 0
rl, i f Z
d,k
i < 0 (30)
3.4.4 Expansion
A central agent or decentralized project operator selects expansion projects
and determines the amount of capacity addition by following the procedure
below:
• Step 0: Links with their volume–capacity ratios above a threshold (Q∗)
constitute a set of candidates for expansion.
• Step 1: Sort candidate links based on volume–capacity ratios from high
to low
• Step 2: Expand the first link among remaining candidates by the
amount of
Ca = fa/Q∗ − Ca (31)
.
• Step 3: Deduct the expansion cost (Ee(Ca)) from the expansion budget.
• Step 4: If expansion budget has not been exhausted and there are remain-
ing candidates, go to Step 2; otherwise stop.
3.4.5 New construction
As the most essential part of the incremental network growth problem, the
process of constructing new roads is implemented in the following procedure:
First, find candidate projects of internal and external connections. A candi-
date project is identified if and only if no links have been established between
a pair of established nodes along the geographical shortest path. To illustrate,
three candidate projects are identified in Fig. 1 corresponding to connections
v3 − v4, v5 − v7, and v8 − v9. Although v4 and v7 are not fully connected by
established links along the geographical shortest path, the connection between
them is not identified as a candidate project because it contains an established
link v4 − v5. If two established nodes are already connected, but not along the
geographical shortest path, and if the total length of the proposed connection
(along the geographical shortest path) is either less than 2 km or less than
25% shorter than that of the current connection (along the least-cost route),
the corresponding project will be eliminated from consideration because it is
expected that in this case expanding the current connection would be more
efficient as compared to building a new connection, as no additional land
acquisition cost will be involved. For example, proposed connection v4 − v5
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may be eliminated if the distance between v4 and v5 is 2 km or 25% shorter
than that of the current connection v3 − v5 − v4.
Second, estimate traffic volumes for a candidate project. The difficulty of
this step lies in the trade-off between the accuracy of volume estimation and
the running time required for evaluating a range of candidate projects. For
an internal connection, for example v3 − v4 in Fig. 1, we add into Gm two
hypothetical links that connect v3 − v4 in opposite directions (despite that a
hypothetical link may represent a series of links in the complete graph), with a
length of the geographically shortest distance between v3 − v4, and a proposed
capacity of 400 vehicle/h (in this study it is equivalent to one lane). A stochastic
network loading is then performed once and the loaded traffic on the two
hypothetical links is used to approximate the equilibrium flows (the accuracy
could be improved by iterating this step with the estimated volume, but again,
it depends on the trade-off between the accuracy and the running time).
The flow estimation for an external connection follows the same procedure
except that a network loading is not necessary, because the hypothetical links
serve as the only connections between Gm and Gn. Thus the flow on the





Third, estimate benefits from a candidate project. The increase in accessibility









e−θ t̂ij − e−θ tij) (33)
For a project under centralized control, the gains in land use due to
increased accessibility in all the places will be summed up while for a project
under decentralized control, a local jurisdiction considers only the increased
value of local properties. A local jurisdiction also considers the estimated toll
revenue from non-residents as benefits.
Fourth, estimate new construction cost for a candidate project. To increase
realism with the presence of lumpy investments, suppose a link is designed
in discrete lanes, and each lane represents a capacity of 400 veh/hr. The least
number of lanes will be chosen such as:
Ca > f̂a/Q∗ (34)
The cost of constructing this amount of capacity will be estimated
accordingly.
Fifth, select one project for investment. For a central agent, only candi-
date projects with a benefit–cost ratio above one will be considered, among
which the candidate with the highest benefit–cost ratio will be built with
proposed capacities on opposite directions. Up to one new road will be
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constructed according to the definition of incremental connection problem.
The benefit–cost ratio of a candidate project is estimated as:
Hcp = πAcp/En,p (35)
Under decentralized control, matters become more complicated as more
than one place maybe eligible to participate in a construction project. Given
the complexity this process involves, heuristic assumptions are included in
the implementation procedure. To approximate the border effect and spatial
monopoly effect, we assume a place is eligible if this place is an end node
of the proposed connection, or if it is the (full or partial) owner of a link
that is directly connected to either end node when the end node is not a
place. It is also assumed that the toll revenue and construction cost of a
project will be split among participating jurisdictions in proportion to the
projected traffic they will generate on the proposed links. To build the internal
connection v3 − v4 in Fig. 1, for example, eligible places include v3 and the
owner places of links v1 − v4 and v5 − v4 (as v4 is not a place). Additionally,
each participating place will estimate the proportion of resident travelers on
the proposed connection, and considers toll revenue only from non-resident
travelers as its benefit. Suppose the planning horizon of a road project is N
years, the estimated proportion of resident-travelers from place i on road p is











/χ ip En,p (36)
A participating place will quit a project if its estimated benefit–cost ratio
is below one. When a place quits, the benefit–cost ratios of the remaining
participating places need to be re-estimated since the split of toll revenue and
construction cost changes. Eventually, a list of candidate projects is developed
with each participating place in each project having a benefit–cost ratio above
one. Each place then ranks candidate projects according to its own benefit–
cost ratio. A place would build the most cost-effective projects first, but it
also compromises its own priorities to reach possible cooperation with other
places, because each participant has equal right to veto a project. In this
case, negotiation between participating places is in order. A project selection
procedure implements this process as follows:
• Step 0: For any time period, starting from n=1.
• Step 1: For a list of candidate projects, each eligible place considers only
the top n candidate projects ranked by its own benefit–cost ratios.
• Step 2: If any participating place of a candidate project ranks this project
beyond its top n candidate list, this project will be eliminated.
• Step 3: If no qualifying project is found, n := n + 1 and go to Step 1; if
n reaches a threshold (say ten), the whole process is terminated with no
project built; otherwise go to Step 4.
• Step 4: A qualifying project can be self-financed if the current balance of
each participating place can cover its share of construction cost. Among










Fig. 4 Snapshots of incremental network growth (a) the initial network; (b) Experiment A,
iteration 4 (c) Experiment A, iteration 8 (d) Experiment A, iteration 12 versus (e) Experiment
B, iteration 4 (f) Experiment B, iteration 8 (g) Experiment B, iteration 12
the qualifying projects that can be self-financed, the one with the lowest
financial risk (indicated by the ratio of anticipated toll revenue to con-
struction cost) will be built. If no qualifying project can be self-financed,
a loan is involved. The bank agent will instead minimize its own financial
risk by selecting the qualifying project with the lowest ratio of projected
toll revenue to the total amount of loans.
4 Simulation experiments
The model of incremental network connection is tested with a specified initial
set of established places on a hexagonal complete graph1 in two experiments:
Experiment A is executed under centralized jurisdictional control in which a
central government agent builds and manages all the roads, while Experiment
B implements decentralized jurisdictional control under which local jurisdic-
tions build and operate roads projects on their own. The distance between
two neighboring hexagon centers is
√
3/3 km. Hexagon centers represent the
possible locations of places, from which ten locations are randomly selected.
Two of them are specified as bigger places each with 50,000 residents and
50,000 jobs, while the remaining eight ones are much smaller each with 5,000
residents and 5,000 jobs. The initial set of places is illustrated in Fig. 4(a),
1The hexagonal graph is created following Hargett (1966), in which vertices and edges represent
the possible location of established nodes (places or intersections) and established links (segments
of roads), respectively.
478 F. Xie, D. Levinson
in which dark dots represent established places while gray dots and lines
represent potential nodes and links.
Table 3 lists model coefficients and their specified values for the experi-
ments. While it is intended for providing a practical tool of assessing policies
under alternative jurisdictional controls, the present version of the model is not
calibrated, and tests a number of arbitrarily specified parameters. In this regard
the following comparison of the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) under
centralized versus decentralized control provides more of a demonstration.
The current simulation model, however, enables us to predict the deployment
course of a road network in a sequential process, and evaluate how network
development could be affected by the pricing and investment policies under
different types of jurisdictional control.
In Experiment A the new construction ends after 11 years and expansion
continues until the simulation is terminated at the end of the 50th year. The
first nine connections are external connections while the last two are internal
connections. Eventually the annual travel demand on the established network
reaches a total travel time of 50.1 billion vehicle hours or a total distance of 291
million vehicle kilometers. As shown in Fig. 5, a test compares the predicted
volumes (given in the investment models) on the consecutive new connections
added during the first 11 consecutive years versus the assigned volumes (given
in the travel demand models) on corresponding links in the next iteration when
a proposed new connection has actually been incorporated in the established
network. As can be seen, the new construction model works well in predicting
the travel demand on a proposed new connection in the near future.
In Experiment B the new construction also occurs during the first 11
consecutive years, while the expansion continues until the end of the 50th year,
when an annual travel time of 54.0 billion vehicle hours or a total distance of
299 million vehicle kilometers is consumed.
Figure 6 compares the resultant road investment in Experiments A and B.
As can be seen, local jurisdictions invest more in road infrastructure than the
central agent, with a little bit higher spending on new construction and much
Table 3 Specified values for simulation experiments
Value Source
N 25 years Common practice
υ $10 /h Common practice
rs, rl 0.03, 0.05 Specified
κ 0.5 veh Specified convergence rule
t0 1.0 min Specified
ξ0, ξ1, ξ2 0, 0.25, 0 Specified
σ0, σ1, σ2 0, 0, 0.25 Specified
Q∗ 0.95 Specified
ρ1, ρ2 0.2, 0.75 Behavioral assumptions on heuristic price probing
ω1, ω2 -30.6, 9.8 Empirical estimates by Zhang and Levinson (2005b)
θ 0.048/min Empirical estimate by Levinson et al. (2007)
β0, β1, β2 5.79, 0.50, 0.39 Empirical estimates by Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003)
φ 1/0.11 Adopted from Suwansirikul et al. (1987)
π $12.71 Empirical estimates by El-Geneidy and Levinson (2006)

















Fig. 5 Estimated versus assigned volumes on the new connections that appeared every iteration
Experiment A. To be succinct, the volumes on only one direction of new connections are depicted
higher expansion expenditure. The road networks developed in the centralized
and decentralized scenarios, however, eventually provide rather close spatial
accessibility, which implies centralized road provision is more efficient than
decentralized road provision if the central agent has perfect information on
individual links and if the costs associated with bureaucracy, operation, and
management are ignored.
The centralized pricing policies based on marginal cost pricing result in a
deficit of 1.58 billion dollars at the end of the 50th year. Note that the empirical
investment models specified in Eqs. (27) and (28) with β1 smaller than 1.0 imply
economy of scale in capacity. This agrees with the marginal cost pricing theory
in that toll receipts will fall short of the facility costs if there are economies
of scale in road provision (Gomez-Ibanez et al. 1999). Additionally, although
jurisdictions may accurately predict the flow and toll revenue in the near future
on a new connection at the time the investment decision is made, as more and
more new roads are built in the long run, the demand on previously built roads
may drop and the profitability of previous projects be undermined, which may
lead to financial deficit on road infrastructure.
Local jurisdictions as a whole collect much less toll revenue than the central
jurisdiction, despite the fact that they invested a lot more in road infrastructure
and attracted more traffic, which results in a larger deficit (1.89 billion dollars)
for them (though it would be expected that toll revenue will eventually cover
all the investments as time goes on, since large-scale investment has been
completed). Local jurisdictions collect less toll revenue probably because they
impose a variable toll rate on individual links, and the links have to compete





































































































































Fig. 6 Comparison of MOEs under centralized (Experiment A) vs. decentralized (Experiment B)
control with regard to their (a) cumulative spending on new construction (b) cumulative spending
on expansion, (c) cumulative toll revenues, and (d) resultant spatial accessibility
with each other on parallel routes for through traffic. Another observation
worth noting is that local jurisdictions invest in new construction faster than
the central agent, as can be seen in Graph 5a. This can be explained by the
fact that when local jurisdictions evaluate a road project, they consider not
only the increase of spatial accessibility, but also the future toll revenue from
non-resident travelers as their benefits.
Starting from the same network shown in Fig. 4(a), the staged network
growth under centralized and decentralized jurisdictional control is illustrated
in Figs. 4(b)–(d) and in Figs. 4(e)–(g), respectively. As can be seen, the
sequences of connections in both cases are similar: in the first four iterations, a
central corridor is built between the two bigger places, forming the backbone
of the road network; in the next four iterations, minor places in the corners
are connected one by one; internal connections are then added in the last
four iterations, which create rings and serve as shortcuts between places. The
difference between the two scenarios lies in the fact that local jurisdictions,
rather than directly connecting to other places, tend to connect to a node in
the middle of a link so that the construction cost could be split among more
involved places. Consequently, different network topologies are generated
under centralized versus decentralized control. As can be seen, centralized
control results in a network that connects places on a belt, on which roads
are complementary to each other, while under decentralized control places on
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the south-east corner are connected to others via two parallel roads built by
different groups of jurisdictions, which are more competitive in the network.
5 Concluding remarks
Road infrastructure evolves over time in a complex process as part of a
dynamic and open system including travel demand, land use, as well as
economic and political initiatives. This study implements the deployment of
a road network as an endogenous process of incremental connections, played
out in SONIC as the outcome of the decisions made by travelers with regard
to destination and route choice in the short run, and by central or local public
authorities with regard to road pricing and investment in the long run, from
different political initiatives.
This study finds that equilibrium will be reached on a network between road
operators and travelers if a link-by-link marginal-cost pricing policy is adopted
in the centralized scenario. In the decentralized case, a heuristic pricing-
probing measure is proposed for local jurisdictions to adjust the toll rate on
each subordinate link in response to the variable demand, with uncertainty
about other jurisdictions in the network environment. This strategy deserves
investigation in terms of how autonomous road operator will actually adjust
its toll rates upon the change of travel demand on a link with incomplete
information on the competitor and cooperator links.
Simulation results disclose that both centralized and decentralized road
provision result in a financial deficit. This finding agrees with the marginal-
cost pricing theory in that toll receipts will fall short of the facility costs
if there are economies of scale in road provision. The inefficiency in road
investment may also be attributed to the myopia of an incremental investment
process that relies intricately on a sequence of network growth decisions, even
if jurisdictions pursue an optimal investment strategy at the point when the
decision is made. Simulation results also show that local jurisdictions tend to
make a larger investment on road infrastructure than a central jurisdiction,
while collecting less toll revenues, suggesting centralized road provision is
more efficient if the central authority has complete information on individual
links and if the costs associated with its bureaucracy and management are
ignored. In reality, the trade-off between the factors favoring centralization
(such as economy of scale and economy of scope in road provision) versus
those favoring localization (such as improved information on local markets)
needs to be addressed.
SONIC has the potential to answer the questions such as how urban road
networks have developed into various topologies, which network patterns
are more efficient, and whether and how transport engineers, planners, and
decision makers can guide the dynamics of land uses and infrastructure into
their desired direction in a sequential process, especially providing a planning
tool that allows us to test the consequence of different pricing and investment
strategies under alternative jurisdictional ownership structures.
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